A vulnerability in JetBrains TeamCity prior to version 2021.2.1 allowed attackers to perform URL injection, which could be leveraged to conduct Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks. The flaw existed due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input in URLs, enabling attackers to craft malicious links that, when visited by authenticated users, could trigger unintended actions within TeamCity.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2022-24342, a vulnerability in JetBrains TeamCity (versions prior to 2021.2.1) that allows account takeover via a CSRF attack in the GitHub OAuth2 authentication flow. The repository contains three files: a README.md with detailed instructions and background, a Python exploit script (exploit.py), and a requirements.txt listing dependencies (requests, fastapi, uvicorn). The exploit works by running a FastAPI web server that acts as a malicious OAuth2 application. The attacker sends a crafted link to the victim, which, when visited, manipulates the OAuth2 flow to link the victim's TeamCity account to the attacker's GitHub account. The exploit leverages network-based attack vectors and requires the attacker to set up a public-facing server (e.g., via ngrok). The main endpoints involved are the /exploit and /callback routes on the attacker's server, and the OAuth2 endpoints on the target TeamCity instance and GitHub. The exploit is a functional proof-of-concept and demonstrates the vulnerability's impact but does not include weaponized or automated post-exploitation features.
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