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SiteServer CMS v7.x contains a vulnerability that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code by submitting a specially crafted plug-in. The vulnerability arises from insufficient validation or sanitization of plug-in content, enabling attackers to inject and execute malicious code within the CMS environment.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a malicious plugin for the SSCMS content management system, designed to exploit the plugin installation feature to gain remote code execution. The exploit is implemented in C# (Startup.cs), where the ConfigureServices method starts a new thread that establishes a reverse TCP connection to a hardcoded IP address and port (default: 172.17.0.1:8889). Once connected, it receives commands from the attacker, executes them using /bin/bash, and returns the output. The exploit is operational and requires the attacker to modify the IP address in Startup.cs, compile the plugin, and upload it to a vulnerable SSCMS instance via the offline plugin installation feature. The repository includes full source code for the plugin, supporting files for advertisement management (which are not directly related to the exploit), and documentation (Detail.md, README.md) describing the exploitation process. The main attack vector is through uploading a malicious plugin, and the exploit provides a reverse shell to the attacker. No specific CVE is referenced, but the exploit targets SSCMS 7.1.0 and likely affects both Windows and Linux deployments.
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