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CVE-2022-30024 is a buffer overflow vulnerability in the httpd daemon on TP-Link TL-WR841N/TL-WR841 devices. According to the provided information, the flaw is present in firmware 3.16.9 on TL-WR841N V12 devices and also affects TL-WR841 V12 TL-WR841N(EU)_V12_160624, TL-WR841 V11 TL-WR841N(EU)_V11_160325, TL-WR841N_V11_150616, and TL-WR841 V10 TL-WR841N_V10_150310. An authenticated remote attacker can trigger the overflow by sending a crafted HTTP GET request to the System Tools page in the router's web management interface, leading to arbitrary code execution in the vulnerable httpd process.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small standalone exploit PoC for CVE-2022-30024 targeting TP-Link WR841 v10 routers. It contains two files: a brief README identifying the target and a single Python exploit script, sploit.py. The script is the main entry point and combines HTTP interaction with low-level exploit construction. The exploit workflow is: (1) compute the MD5 of the configured admin password, (2) build a TP-Link-specific Authorization cookie using base64(login:md5(password)), (3) send a GET request to /userRpm/LoginRpm.htm?Save=Save, (4) parse the returned HTML for a 16-character uppercase alphanumeric session token (stok), and (5) send a second GET request to /<session>/userRpm/PingIframeRpm.htm with the malicious payload placed in the ping_addr parameter. The request also sets a DiagnosticRpm.htm referer to mimic normal router UI behavior. The exploit code uses pwntools and explicitly sets MIPS big-endian 32-bit context, indicating the target architecture of the router firmware. It hardcodes several gadget addresses and helper routines to assemble a ROP chain, followed by a NOP sled and embedded shellcode. Because these addresses are fixed, the exploit is tightly coupled to the vulnerable firmware memory layout and is not broadly portable across models or versions. The included shellcode is labeled as reboot shellcode, so the demonstrated effect is code execution sufficient to reboot the device rather than spawn a shell. Overall, this is a real authenticated web/network RCE exploit PoC, not a scanner or detection script. It is operational but basic: credentials, target IP, and payload are hardcoded, and there is no generalized payload customization, reliability logic, or post-exploitation framework integration.
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