The Unified Intents' Unified Remote solution exposes a web management interface that does not require authentication. This allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to modify or disable authentication requirements for the Unified Remote protocol. Once authentication is disabled, the attacker can execute arbitrary code via the protocol, effectively gaining full control over the system running Unified Remote.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (unified_remote_rce.rb) targeting Unified Remote for Windows (tested on version 3.11.0.2483 (50)). The exploit leverages an authentication bypass in the Unified Remote protocol to achieve remote code execution (RCE) on the target system. It can either interact with the Unified Remote web interface (port 9510) to set the access control to 'no password' or attempt exploitation blindly if the web interface is not accessible. The exploit works by simulating keystrokes to open a command prompt and type out a payload, or by sending commands directly via the protocol. The default payload is a reverse shell, but any compatible Metasploit Windows payload can be used. The exploit is operational and provides a shell or code execution on the target. The module is well-documented, includes references to the CVE (CVE-2022-3229), and provides options for configuration such as target ports, payload staging path, and sleep intervals. The only file in the repository is the Metasploit module itself, written in Ruby.
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