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CVE-2022-3294 is a validation bypass in Kubernetes kube-apiserver's node proxying functionality. Kubernetes supports proxying through the API server to Node/Kubelet endpoints for operations such as establishing connections to Pods and retrieving container logs. Although kube-apiserver is intended to validate the proxy target address for Node objects, a bug allowed this validation to be bypassed. As a result, authenticated requests sent via node proxying could be redirected to endpoints reachable from the API server's private or control plane network rather than being constrained to the intended Node address.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a small Bash proof-of-concept (exploit.sh) plus a README describing prerequisites and enumeration steps. The exploit targets Kubernetes RBAC/API behavior around `nodes/status` and `nodes/proxy`. Core technique: - It authenticates to the kube-apiserver using a bearer token provided via environment variable `tkn`. - It downloads the target node’s `/status` object, then rewrites fields so the node’s reported kubelet endpoint (normally port 10250 on the node IP) is replaced with the kube-apiserver endpoint (port 6443 and API server IP). - It PATCHes the modified node status back to the apiserver (requires `patch/update` on `nodes/status`). - It then calls the node proxy endpoints (`/api/v1/nodes/<node>/proxy/...`) to access Kubernetes API resources (secrets/pods/services). If the proxy is redirected to the apiserver, these proxy calls effectively become API calls routed through the node proxy mechanism. Notable characteristics: - Network-based API abuse; no memory corruption. - Uses `curl -k` (TLS verification disabled). - Hardcoded example values for NODE, NODE_IP, API_SERVER_IP, and port 6443; token must be supplied externally. Repository structure: - README.md: links to upstream Kubernetes issues/audit report and outlines how to find the apiserver IP and a service account token with the needed RBAC permissions. - exploit.sh: the only code file and the entry point implementing the status patch + node proxy pivot to enumerate cluster resources (including secrets).
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