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CVE-2022-41924 is an origin-validation vulnerability in Tailscale for Windows prior to version 1.32.3. The local Tailscale API was exposed on a local TCP socket and communicated with the graphical client in cleartext without Host-header verification. A malicious website could use DNS rebinding to issue local API requests through the victim’s browser and reconfigure tailscaled to use an attacker-controlled coordination server. The malicious coordination server could then return responses that cause executable delivery or SMB-share installation, resulting in remote code execution on the affected Windows node.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a proof-of-concept (POC) exploit for CVE-2022-41924, a vulnerability in Tailscale's local API that can be abused via DNS rebinding. The repository contains three main HTML files: - 1.html: Initiates the DNS rebinding attack by repeatedly polling the server and, upon success, loads 2.html from a rebinding-aware subdomain. - 2.html: After rebinding, this file writes a crafted HTML file (3.html) and a Windows PE executable (GoogleUpdate.exe) to the local Tailscale API using HTTP PUT requests. It then loads the written file via the local API. - 3.html: This file, when loaded, sends a PATCH request to the Tailscale local API endpoint /localapi/v0/prefs, changing the ControlURL to a potentially malicious server. The exploit demonstrates the ability to write arbitrary files and modify configuration on the local Tailscale service, which could lead to remote code execution or full compromise of the Tailscale client. The attack requires the victim to visit the attacker's crafted web pages in a browser, leveraging DNS rebinding to bypass localhost protections. The repository is structured as a POC and does not include weaponized payloads, but it clearly demonstrates the exploit chain and its impact.
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