Loading vulnerability…
dotCMS core versions 5.3.8.5 through 5.3.8.15 and 21.03 through 22.10.1 use a cryptographically insecure random number generator to create password-reset tokens. This weakness allows attackers to predict or brute-force password-reset tokens, potentially leading to unauthorized account access and account takeover.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a proof-of-concept exploit targeting the password reset functionality of dotCMS (version 22.10.1, as configured in the provided docker-compose.yml). The main exploit logic resides in poc.py, which automates the process of requesting password resets for specific users, records timing information, and then attempts to brute-force or predict the password reset token using an external cracking tool (randomstringutils/crack). The exploit then tries to use the generated tokens to reset the password for the targeted account by sending requests to the /api/v1/changePassword endpoint. The docker-compose.yml file sets up a test environment with dotCMS, PostgreSQL, and Elasticsearch, while .gitmodules references a submodule containing the cracking utility. The exploit is network-based, targeting the dotCMS API endpoints, and requires the attacker to have access to the password reset mechanism. The overall structure is typical for a POC exploit, with clear steps for setup, exploitation, and verification.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.