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A local privilege escalation vulnerability in the client update process of Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client Software for Windows and Cisco Secure Client Software for Windows allows a low-privileged authenticated user to obtain SYSTEM privileges. The issue occurs after a successful VPN connection, when the client update workflow creates a temporary directory with improper permissions. Because that directory is insufficiently protected, an attacker can abuse Windows Installer behavior during the update process to redirect privileged file operations and execute attacker-controlled code in the context of SYSTEM.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2023-20178, an arbitrary file delete vulnerability in Cisco Secure Client (5.0.01242) and Cisco AnyConnect (4.10.06079) on Windows. The exploit is implemented in C++ and consists of a Visual Studio project with the main logic in 'main.cpp', supported by helper classes for file operation locks and Windows resource manipulation. The exploit abuses the way the Cisco VPN client creates and manages temporary directories in 'C:\windows\temp', exploiting a race condition to delete arbitrary files as SYSTEM. It then leverages Windows Installer's rollback mechanism to overwrite a rollback script (.rbs) in 'C:\Config.msi', ultimately spawning a SYSTEM-level command prompt for privilege escalation. The repository includes all necessary code and resources to build and run the exploit, and the README provides a clear explanation of the vulnerability and exploitation steps. The attack vector is local, requiring execution on a system with the vulnerable VPN client installed. The exploit targets specific file system locations, notably 'C:\windows\temp\<random>\tmp' and 'C:\Config.msi', and manipulates rollback scripts to achieve code execution as SYSTEM.
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