CVE-2023-20904 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in Android Settings. The flaw is in getTrampolineIntent in SettingsActivity.java, where an Intent mismatch can result in the launch of an arbitrary activity. On affected Android 12L and Android 13 devices, this improper handling of Intent redirection can allow a local attacker to cause privileged application behavior outside intended constraints. Exploitation does not require additional execution privileges and does not require user interaction.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository demonstrates a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2023-20904, an Android Intent redirection vulnerability. The project is structured as a multi-module Android Studio project with two main modules: 'app' (the vulnerable application) and 'attack' (the attacker application). The vulnerable app (com.example.cve) exposes multiple activities, including MainActivity, SettingsActivity, and MaliciousActivity, all of which are exported. The MainActivity processes incoming Intents and, due to not clearing the Intent selector, can be tricked into launching the MaliciousActivity instead of the intended SettingsActivity. The attacker app (com.example.attack) crafts a malicious Intent with a selector pointing to the MaliciousActivity and sends it to the vulnerable app's MainActivity. This results in the execution of code in the context of the vulnerable app, demonstrating the exploit. The repository includes all necessary AndroidManifest, Java source, and resource files for both apps, as well as build scripts. The exploit is local (requires both apps on the same device) and does not use any external network endpoints.
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3 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.