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CVE-2023-26258 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in Arcserve Unified Data Protection (UDP) Backup affecting versions 7.0 through 9.0, including builds through 9.0.6034. According to the provided content, the getVersionInfo method exposed via WebServiceImpl/services/FlashServiceImpl leaks an AuthUUID token. An attacker can use this token against /WebServiceImpl/services/VirtualStandbyServiceImpl to obtain a valid authenticated session. The resulting session can then be used to execute tasks with administrator privileges. Supporting reporting further indicates the attack flow involves capturing SOAP requests containing AuthUUID values and, in some scenarios, retrieving and decrypting exposed administrator credentials. The flaw affects the authentication boundary protecting the UDP administrative interface and related service endpoints.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a suite of tools targeting CA ArcServe UDP, primarily exploiting CVE-2023-26258 (authentication bypass in the management web interface) and related insecure credential storage/retrieval mechanisms. The main exploit (ArcServe-exploit.py) targets the ArcServe management web interface (port 8014) to retrieve the admin username, authentication UUID, and ultimately the encrypted admin password via unauthenticated SOAP requests. The password is base64-decoded and requires further decryption. Supporting tools include: - ArcServeRadar.py: Scans the local network for ArcServe instances via UDP broadcast and enumerates their details. - arcserve-dbpwner.py: Connects to the ArcServe database (MSSQL, default creds) to extract usernames and encrypted passwords, as well as host information. - arcserve-regkeys.py: Uses valid Windows credentials to access the remote registry on the ArcServe server and extract the encrypted admin password. - ArcServeDecrypter.c: A C program to decrypt the extracted password bytes into plaintext (e.g., the actual admin password). The README provides detailed usage instructions and example outputs for each tool. The overall purpose of the repository is to automate the discovery and exploitation of insecure credential handling in ArcServe UDP, allowing attackers to escalate privileges or move laterally within a Windows environment. The tools require varying levels of access: some work unauthenticated (if the web interface is vulnerable), others require default or valid credentials. The exploit is operational and provides real credential extraction and decryption capabilities.
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7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A high-severity authentication bypass in Arcserve Unified Data Protection (UDP) that allows local-network attackers to bypass authentication and obtain administrator access to the UDP management/admin interface, enabling retrieval/decryption of admin credentials and potential backup destruction.
An authentication bypass in Arcserve UDP Backup (7.0–9.0) that can allow a local-network attacker to obtain/abuse administrator sessions (via captured SOAP requests containing AuthUUIDs) and access the admin interface, enabling destructive actions such as wiping backups—raising ransomware risk.
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