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CVE-2023-27327 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the Toolgate component of Parallels Desktop. The vulnerability arises from a time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition due to improper locking when performing operations on an object. This flaw allows a local attacker, who can execute code on the guest system, to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user on the host system.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a full VM escape exploit chain for Parallels Desktop for Mac (prior to 18.1.1), targeting CVE-2023-27327 and CVE-2023-27328. The exploit is composed of several Python scripts and a custom Linux kernel module. The kernel module (in prl_mod/prl_tg_pwn) is loaded in the guest VM to bypass security checks and allow arbitrary Toolgate requests via the /proc/driver/prl_tg_pwn device. The main exploit scripts are: - 1_write_file.py: Exploits a race condition in Parallels shared folders to write an arbitrary file from the guest to the host's filesystem. It uses a symlink race to overwrite a file on the host with attacker-controlled data (typically a malicious dylib). - 2_plist_injection.py: Exploits a vulnerability in the handling of Info.plist files for host-side applications. It injects a DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES entry pointing to the malicious dylib, causing the host to load and execute attacker-controlled code. - 3_full_chain.py: Orchestrates the full chain by first writing the dylib to the host and then triggering the plist injection. The repository also includes the source code for the required kernel module, various C header files for Parallels Toolgate internals, and a Python library (toolgate/) for interacting with the Toolgate interface. The exploit requires root in the guest, Parallels Tools, and a mounted shared folder. If successful, it achieves code execution on the host from a compromised guest VM. The attack vector is local (guest-to-host escape), and the main fingerprintable endpoints are the /proc/driver/prl_tg_pwn device and the shared folder mount points (e.g., /media/psf/).
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