Rockwell Automation ThinManager ThinServer contains a path traversal vulnerability in message processing. An unauthenticated remote attacker may exploit the flaw to upload arbitrary files to any directory on the disk drive on which ThinServer.exe is installed. This can enable overwriting of existing executable files with attacker-controlled content, potentially resulting in remote code execution.
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What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module targeting CVE-2023-27855, a path traversal vulnerability in Rockwell Automation ThinManager (versions up to and including 13.0.1). The module allows an attacker to upload an arbitrary file to an arbitrary location on the target system by exploiting the path traversal flaw in the ThinManager service, which listens on TCP port 2031 by default. The attacker can specify both the local file to upload and the remote file path, with the module prepending '../' sequences to escape intended directories. The exploit is operational and can be used to place files (such as executables or webshells) on the target, potentially leading to further compromise. The code is written in Ruby and is designed to be run within the Metasploit Framework. No hardcoded IP addresses or domains are present, but the default file paths and port are fingerprintable. The module includes a check method to verify if the target is likely vulnerable before attempting exploitation.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
5 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.