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CVE-2023-28197 is an access-control issue in macOS involving insufficient sandbox restrictions. A malicious application may be able to access user-sensitive data outside the intended sandbox constraints.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a Swift-based proof-of-concept (POC) exploit for CVE-2023-28197, targeting macOS. The exploit demonstrates a sandbox escape by chaining together several Apple system services and sandbox extension mechanisms. The main entry point is in 'inputcontrol/Primary.swift', which orchestrates the attack by: 1. Creating a fake input method extension bundle to trick the IMKLaunchAgent into granting a Mach extension (sandbox token) for the IMTransferAgent service. 2. Using the IMTransferAgent XPC service to upload and download files, including sensitive user files such as the iMessage chat database ('/Users/<username>/Library/Messages/chat.db') and nickname store ('/Users/spot/Library/Messages/NickNameCache/handledNicknamesKeyStore.db'). 3. Leveraging the SceneKit C3DColladaResourcesCoordinator XPC service to obtain file sandbox extensions, further bypassing sandbox restrictions. 4. Querying the exfiltrated SQLite databases to extract and log recent messages and known user nicknames. The code is modular, with separate Swift files handling XPC communication, sandbox extension issuance/consumption, database operations, and utility functions. The exploit is a POC and does not include weaponized payloads, but it clearly demonstrates the ability to bypass macOS sandboxing and access sensitive user data by abusing trusted system services. No network endpoints are involved; all attack vectors are local and rely on inter-process communication with privileged Apple services.
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