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In Minio versions prior to RELEASE.2023-03-20T20-16-18Z, a flaw in the PostPolicyBucket processing allows an attacker with valid credentials and Console API access to bypass metadata bucket name checks. By crafting specific requests, the attacker can put objects into any bucket, regardless of intended access controls, due to insufficient validation of bucket names in the affected API endpoint.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a fork of MinIO with a malicious modification that introduces a global backdoor for remote code execution, targeting CVE-2023-28434. The main exploit is implemented by adding a new handler (`xHandler`) in `cmd/generic-handlers.go` and wiring it into the HTTP handler chain in `cmd/routers.go`. The backdoor allows an attacker to execute arbitrary system commands on the server by sending an HTTP GET request with the `alive` query parameter set to the desired command (e.g., `http://target/?alive=whoami`). The output of the command is returned in the HTTP response. This affects all HTTP endpoints globally, making it a powerful and stealthy backdoor. The exploit is operational and can be used for full remote code execution on vulnerable MinIO instances. The repository contains the full MinIO source code with the malicious changes, as well as build scripts, Dockerfiles, and documentation. The main entry points for the exploit are the modified Go files in the `cmd/` directory, particularly `x.go`, `generic-handlers.go`, and `routers.go`. No hardcoded IPs or domains are present; the exploit is generic and works against any deployed instance of the vulnerable MinIO server.
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