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NVIDIA GeForce Now for Android contains a vulnerability in its game launcher component, where implicit intents intended for the streamer component can be intercepted and processed by a malicious application on the same device. This allows an attacker to exploit the intent handling mechanism to perform unauthorized actions.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a two-app Android lab that reproduces the vulnerability pattern behind CVE-2023-31014 as an educational proof of concept, not a real GeForce NOW exploit. The structure contains a victim app and an attacker app. The victim app models a game launcher (victim/MainActivity) and a normal streamer component (victim/StreamerActivity). It builds an implicit intent with action lab.cve202331014.action.START_STREAM and attaches demo session data in extras: game ID, account alias, session ID, stream config, and stream endpoint. In the vulnerable path, startActivity(intent) is called without package or component targeting, allowing Android's resolver to offer any matching handler. The attacker app exposes HijackActivity via an exported intent-filter for the same action and default category. If selected, HijackActivity receives the victim extras, displays the captured values, and prevents the legitimate streamer from launching, demonstrating both information disclosure and denial of service. The fixed path in victim/MainActivity uses intent.setClass(this, StreamerActivity.class) before startActivity(), converting the flow to an explicit intent and blocking external interception. There is no real network exploitation, no remote C2, and no actual code execution chain; the payload is limited to local Android intent interception and display of intercepted data. The repository includes standard Gradle/Android project files, manifests for both apps, and Java source implementing the vulnerable flow, malicious handler, and mitigation example.
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