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A directory traversal vulnerability exists in Repetier Server through version 1.4.10, where the application fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input, allowing attackers to use encoded sequences such as '..%5c' to traverse directories and read arbitrary files, including those containing sensitive credentials. This issue is exemplified in the connectionLost.php script.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a small Python proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2023-31059 affecting Repetier-Server <= 1.4.10 on Windows. The exploit performs unauthenticated remote path traversal / local file inclusion by sending HTTP GET requests to the Repetier-Server web interface (commonly on TCP/3344), targeting the endpoint 'base/connectionLost.php'. It generates a traversal string consisting of repeated '..%5c' (URL-encoded Windows backslash) and appends a chosen Windows file path (also backslash-encoded as %5c). Two request patterns are attempted: (1) 'base/connectionLost.php?file=<traversal><file>' and (2) a path-based variant 'views<traversal><file>/base/connectionLost.php'. On a likely successful response (HTTP 200 and content length > 60), it prints a preview of the returned file contents. The README documents usage, default port, and high-value file targets such as 'ProgramData\\Repetier-Server\\database\\user.sql' and 'config.xml'. Overall purpose: demonstrate and validate arbitrary file read against vulnerable Repetier-Server instances without authentication.
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