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CVE-2023-31742 is a command injection vulnerability in the Linksys WRT54GL router running firmware version 4.30.18.006. The issue is present in the web management interface, specifically in the httpd process's Start_EPI() function. An authenticated attacker with web management privileges can inject arbitrary OS commands via crafted POST parameters, including wl_ant, wl_rate, WL_atten_ctl, ttcp_num, and ttcp_size. Successful exploitation results in execution of attacker-controlled commands on the device and can lead to shell-level access.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module targeting Linksys WRT54GL routers vulnerable to OS command injection (CVE-2023-31742). The exploit requires valid credentials to the router's web interface (default: admin/admin or admin with blank password) and targets the '/apply.cgi' endpoint over HTTP (default port 80). The module performs a login, then sends a specially crafted POST request with the 'wan_hostname' parameter containing a shell command wrapped in backticks, resulting in blind command execution on the router. The exploit is blind, meaning no output is returned, but commands like 'ping' can be used for verification. The module allows the user to specify any command to execute, and can be used to upload and run a netcat binary for a remote shell. The exploit will overwrite network and DHCP configuration on the device. The code is written in Ruby and is designed to be run within the Metasploit framework.
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