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CVE-2023-32692 is an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in the CodeIgniter 4 PHP framework. The issue resides in the Validation library when Validation Placeholders are used. Because controller validation methods and in-model validation rely on the same Validation library internally, those code paths are also affected. A successful attacker can trigger execution of arbitrary code through crafted input processed by vulnerable validation logic. The issue was fixed in CodeIgniter version 4.3.5.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a runnable proof-of-concept environment for CVE-2023-32692, a CodeIgniter 4 validation rule injection vulnerability affecting versions 4.0.0 through 4.3.4. It is not a scanner or detection-only project; it is a deliberately vulnerable demo application built from the CodeIgniter app starter and pinned to codeigniter4/framework 4.3.4 in composer.json. The core exploit logic is in app/Controllers/Poc.php. The vulnerable method, Poc::update(), defines validation rules as a single string: 'required|is_unique[users.email,id,{id}]'. User-controlled POST data is then supplied for id and email. Because the rule string contains a placeholder and is string-based, attacker input in id can break out of the intended rule context and inject additional validation rules. The repository includes a benign baseline request, a rule-injection example, and a command-execution example. The command-execution PoC uses id=1]|system|[ and email=touch+/tmp/pwn, demonstrating that injected validation can reach PHP's system() and execute an OS command. Repository structure is mostly standard CodeIgniter boilerplate: app/Config contains framework configuration, public/index.php is the web entry point, spark is the CLI entry point, and tests/ contains starter tests. The exploit-relevant files are app/Controllers/Poc.php, app/Config/Routes.php, README.md, and the three files under http_requests/. Routes expose POST /poc/update and GET /poc/form; README also mentions a safe variant updateSafe(), but that route is not registered in app/Config/Routes.php. A migration creates a users table required by the is_unique rule. The env file configures SQLite3 with database.db, making the demo easy to run locally. Operationally, the exploit is web-based and targets the local demo service at localhost:8080. The devcontainer and README show how to launch the app and send crafted HTTP requests. The payload is basic and hardcoded rather than highly customizable, so OPERATIONAL is the best maturity fit.
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