Loading vulnerability…
CVE-2023-33012 is a command injection vulnerability in the configuration parser of Zyxel ATP, USG FLEX, USG FLEX 50(W), USG20(W)-VPN, and VPN series firewalls (firmware versions 5.00/5.10 through 5.36 Patch 2). The vulnerability exists in the /ztp/cgi-bin/parse_config.py endpoint and can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker on the LAN to execute arbitrary OS commands via a crafted GRE configuration, but only when cloud management mode (SD-WAN) is enabled. This mode is not enabled by default, and the exploit requires a two-step process involving file upload and command injection. The exploit can generally only be used once per device unless the attacker resets the GRE interface.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (zyxel_parse_config_rce.rb) that exploits a pre-authentication command injection vulnerability (CVE-2023-33012) in multiple Zyxel devices (VPN, USG, ATP series) running specific firmware versions. The exploit works by uploading a payload to the device via a vulnerable HTTP endpoint (/ztp/cgi-bin/parse_config.py) and then triggering command execution through a crafted configuration file. The module includes logic to fingerprint the device and version, upload and execute arbitrary commands or Metasploit payloads, and retrieve command output via another endpoint (/ztp/cgi-bin/dumpztplog.py). The exploit is operational, allowing remote code execution as root, and is designed for use within the Metasploit framework. The code is well-structured, with clear separation of checking, exploitation, and cleanup logic. The only file present is the Metasploit module itself, written in Ruby.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.