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Ibermática RPS 2019 exposes application log data containing SQL queries, usernames, and AES-CBC-encrypted password hashes. The cryptographic protection can be reversed using a .NET function, allowing recovery of affected users' plaintext passwords.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains a minimal proof-of-concept for the IBERMATICA RPS 2019 vulnerability chain involving CVE-2023-3349 and CVE-2023-3350. Structure is simple: one C# source file, a README with the attack narrative and remediation guidance, and a license file. The main code file, CVE-2023-3350.cs, is a standalone console program that uses RijndaelManaged in CBC mode to decrypt a Base64 ciphertext with a 16-byte key and IV. Both values are hardcoded placeholders ('bbbbbbbbbUSER_XX' and 'bbbbbbbbbPASS_XX'), reflecting the README’s claim that keying material is predictably derived from usernames and reused as IV material. The program’s capability is limited to local decryption of an already obtained encrypted password value; it does not automate log retrieval, status-page interaction, authentication bypass, or remote exploitation. The README documents the broader attack chain: an unauthenticated attacker accesses /RPS2019Service/status.html, enables or downloads logs, extracts usernames and encrypted password values from logged SQL queries, derives the AES material, and recovers plaintext passwords. Because the repository does not include code to interact with the web endpoint and instead only demonstrates the cryptographic weakness, it is best classified as a POC exploit component rather than a full operational exploit.
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2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.