D-Link DIR-842V2 v1.0.3 contains a command injection vulnerability in the iperf3 diagnostics function. An attacker can inject arbitrary commands through parameters passed to this function, leading to execution of system commands with the privileges of the web server process.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a working exploit for CVE-2023-33782, a command injection vulnerability in the D-Link DIR-842V2 router (firmware v1.0.3) within the iperf3 diagnostics functionality. The exploit is implemented in Python (exploit.py) and requires valid admin credentials to authenticate to the router's web interface. The script first logs in via HTTP, then establishes a WebSocket connection to the router and sends a specially crafted payload that injects a shell command to start a telnet daemon. After successful exploitation, the script connects to the router via telnet, providing the attacker with a root shell. The repository is structured with a README.md describing the vulnerability and timeline, and a single exploit script. The attack vector is network-based, targeting the router's web management interface and WebSocket endpoint.
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