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A format string vulnerability exists in the ASUS RT-AX56U V2 (firmware 3.0.0.4.386_50460) and RT-AC86U (firmware 3.0.0.4_386_51529) routers. The vulnerability is present in the do_detwan_cgi module of the httpd service, where user input is directly used as a format string in the syslog call within the logmessage_normal function. This allows an authenticated remote attacker with administrator privileges to execute arbitrary code, perform arbitrary system operations, or disrupt service.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2023-35086, a format string vulnerability in the detwan.cgi endpoint of ASUS RT-AX56U V2 and RT-AC86U routers (and potentially other ASUS devices using the same httpd service). The repository contains three files: a .gitignore, a README.md with detailed vulnerability and usage information, and poc_crash.py, the main exploit script. The exploit is written in Python and sends a crafted HTTP GET request to the /detwan.cgi endpoint with a malicious action_mode parameter containing repeated format string specifiers ("%25n"). This triggers the vulnerability, causing a Denial of Service (DoS) by crashing the httpd service. The PoC does not achieve remote code execution but demonstrates the vulnerability's impact. The script allows for both testing the presence of the endpoint and triggering the DoS condition. No hardcoded IPs or domains are present; the target is specified via command-line arguments.
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