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CVE-2023-36661 is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in Shibboleth XMLTooling before 3.2.4, as used by OpenSAML and Shibboleth Service Provider. The issue can be triggered via a crafted XML Signature KeyInfo element, causing the affected software to dereference attacker-influenced external resources during KeyInfo processing. This can result in unintended outbound requests from the vulnerable system to attacker-specified destinations. The issue is fixed in XMLTooling 3.2.4 and, for example, in Shibboleth Service Provider 3.4.1.3 on Windows.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module exploit targeting Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure appliances vulnerable to a chained SSRF (CVE-2024-21893) and command injection (CVE-2024-21887) attack. The exploit works by sending a crafted SOAP request to the public '/dana-ws/saml20.ws' endpoint, which leverages the SSRF to access an internal backend service on 127.0.0.1:8090. This backend is then exploited via command injection, allowing arbitrary command execution as root. The module supports a variety of Metasploit payloads, including reverse shells and Meterpreter sessions. The check method attempts to fingerprint the target by requesting '/dana-na/css/visibility.css' and looking for a 'Pulse Secure' banner. The exploit is weaponized, unauthenticated, and provides full remote code execution on affected systems. The code is written in Ruby and is structured as a standard Metasploit module.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.