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Unity Parsec (Parsec for Windows) contains a time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in the Parsec Loader/updater logic when Parsec is installed in "Per User" mode. The loader intentionally loads DLLs from a user-writable (user-owned) directory, but is intended to perform integrity verification of those DLLs prior to loading. Due to the race condition, a local attacker can win the timing window between integrity verification and subsequent use/loading, replacing or swapping the DLL after it is checked but before it is loaded/executed, resulting in execution in a privileged context and enabling escalation to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. Affected versions are Parsec Loader versions through 8; Parsec Loader 9 is fixed.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2023-37250, a local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerability in Parsec.app (version 150.88.0.0 and likely earlier) on Windows. The exploit leverages a time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) DLL hijacking vulnerability in the Parsec service. The main exploit logic is implemented in 'LPE.ps1', a PowerShell script that orchestrates the attack by manipulating environment variables and directory structures, setting up hardlinks, and racing the Parsec service to load a rogue DLL. The script requires James Forshaw's LPE workshop module for certain operations. The payload is a custom DLL ('raw.cpp'), which, when loaded by the Parsec service, writes a file to 'C:\Users\Public\poc.txt' as proof of SYSTEM-level code execution. The repository also includes a README with a reference to a write-up and a LICENSE file. The exploit is a functional PoC and can be weaponized by replacing the DLL payload with more malicious code. No network endpoints are involved; the attack vector is purely local.
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