CVE-2023-38120 is a command injection vulnerability in Adtran SR400ac routers. The vulnerability resides in the ping command exposed via JSON-RPC, where the host parameter is not properly sanitized. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary commands into a system call, leading to remote code execution as root. Although authentication is nominally required, the authentication mechanism can be bypassed, enabling unauthenticated exploitation.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a proof-of-concept exploit (exploit.py) for CVE-2023-38120, a vulnerability in SmartRG sr400ac routers running firmware versions 10.8.8.1 and 10.8.5.1. The exploit leverages a weakness in the router's authentication and command handling over a WebSocket-based JSON-RPC API. It first retrieves the router's MAC address via an HTTP endpoint, then uses this to derive the default support password and authenticate via the WebSocket interface. After successful authentication, it injects a command into the router's diagnostics functionality, causing the router to open a reverse shell to the attacker's machine using netcat. The exploit is fully automated and requires the attacker to provide the router's IP/port and their own IP/port for the reverse shell. The repository includes a README.md with a brief description, the main exploit script (exploit.py), and a requirements.txt listing necessary Python dependencies. The exploit demonstrates operational maturity, as it provides a working payload and automates the attack process.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.