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The com.altamirano.fabricio.tvbrowser application (up to version 4.5.1) for Android exposes its MainActivity, allowing external applications to send explicit intents that trigger JavaScript code execution within the app's context. This is due to insufficient restrictions on the exported activity, which processes untrusted input.
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This repository documents and demonstrates a code injection and arbitrary file creation vulnerability (CWE-94, CWE-73) in the Android app 'com.altamirano.fabricio.tvbrowser' (version 4.5.1 and earlier). The vulnerability arises from the app's exported MainActivity, which can be invoked by third-party apps via explicit intents. By sending a crafted JavaScript URI through an intent, an attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the app's WebView context. The WebView exposes a JavaScript interface (window.Android.getBase64FromBlobData) that allows arbitrary file creation, enabling attackers to write files (such as text or images) to the device's Downloads folder. The repository provides Java code snippets as proof of concept for both text and image file creation. The structure consists of a detailed markdown report (CWE-94.md) and a reference to another activity (TBA file). No standalone exploit script is present, but the documentation is sufficient for a knowledgeable attacker to reproduce the exploit. The attack vector is local, requiring a malicious app on the same device to trigger the vulnerability.
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