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The File Manager Pro WordPress plugin before version 1.8.1 contains a vulnerability that allows admin users to upload arbitrary files. This flaw exists even in WordPress multisite environments where admin users are not expected to have full server control. The vulnerability can be exploited to upload malicious files, such as web shells, leading to remote code execution on the server.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small standalone Python PoC for CVE-2023-4861 affecting the WordPress plugin File Manager Pro - Filester before 1.8.1. The repository contains only two files: a README describing the vulnerability, prerequisites, and usage, and exploit.py, the actual exploit implementation. The script is not part of a larger exploitation framework. The exploit is an authenticated web attack against a WordPress site. It requires a valid authenticated cookie for a session that can access the Filester interface. The code uses requests.Session with attacker-supplied cookies, fetches the Filester admin page at /wp-admin/admin.php?page=njt-fs-filemanager, and extracts two nonces from the returned HTML/JavaScript using regexes. It then interacts with /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php using WordPress AJAX actions to first read current role restrictions and then weaken them by setting private_folder_access to /var/www/html/ and can_upload_mime to .php. After changing restrictions, the exploit uses the Filester connector action fs_connector to create a file (mkfile), write PHP content into it (put), and finally access the uploaded file directly from the web root as /<shell_name>?cmd=<command>. The payload is a minimal PHP webshell using system($_REQUEST["cmd"]). This gives the operator arbitrary command execution and returns command output in the HTTP response. Operationally, this is more than a bare PoC because it fully automates nonce extraction, restriction modification, file creation, payload writing, and command execution. However, the payload is basic and hardcoded, so OPERATIONAL is the best fit rather than WEAPONIZED. A notable limitation is the hardcoded assumption that the target web root is /var/www/html/ and that files written there are directly web-accessible from the site root.
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