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Atril Document Viewer (default document reader for the MATE desktop environment) prior to version 1.26.2 contains a path traversal vulnerability that enables arbitrary file write. By opening a crafted document, an attacker can cause Atril to write attacker-controlled file contents to an arbitrary filesystem path accessible to the victim user. The described constraint is that existing files cannot be overwritten, but the primitive can still be leveraged to achieve code execution in the context of the user (e.g., by writing new files into locations that influence execution or autostart behavior).
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository is a small standalone Python PoC for CVE-2023-52076 with 3 files: LICENSE, README.md, and a single executable script cve_2023_52076.py. The script is the main entry point and implements malicious EPUB generation rather than vulnerability scanning. Its core purpose is to exploit a zip-slip/path traversal arbitrary file write in vulnerable Atril/Xreader EPUB handling by embedding traversal filenames that resolve through /proc/self/cwd at extraction time. Main capabilities: it supports two exploitation modes. SSH mode generates an RSA keypair via ssh-keygen and places the public key into multiple traversal paths targeting authorized_keys/authorized_keys equivalents, enabling later manual SSH login if the write succeeds. Autostart mode builds a .desktop payload containing an attacker-supplied command and targets ~/.config/autostart so the command executes on the victim's next login. The script also creates both .epub and disguised .pdf copies, validates the ZIP/EPUB structure, and can optionally upload the generated lure to an FTP server using ftplib. Code structure visible from the provided content includes constants for EPUB metadata, traversal path lists for both modes, a Console helper for logging, subprocess handling for ssh-keygen, and a main routine that builds payloads, copies the EPUB to PDF, and optionally uploads via FTP. The exploit is operational rather than just a PoC because it automates payload generation, key creation, packaging, validation, and delivery support, but it is not part of a larger exploitation framework. Fingerprintable targets are primarily local file-write destinations on the victim: ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, ~/.ssh2/authorized_keys, and ~/.config/autostart/exploit.desktop via multiple ../../../../../proc/self/cwd traversal variants. Network interaction is optional and limited to attacker-directed FTP upload (default port 21, anonymous credentials by default). The README also demonstrates an example reverse shell command callback to 10.10.10.10:4444, but that callback is user-supplied example data rather than hardcoded exploit behavior.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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