CVE-2023-5521 is an incorrect authorization vulnerability in the tiann/kernelsu project prior to version 0.6.9. The vulnerability arises from insufficient enforcement of authorization checks, potentially allowing unauthorized users to perform privileged actions within the KernelSU environment.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains two C programs related to CVE-2023-5521, a vulnerability in KernelSU that allows root takeover via signature spoofing. The files are: - check_v2.c: A utility to analyze and print information about the APK signature block in a given APK file. It checks for the presence of a specific signature block ('APK Sig Block 42') and parses its structure, printing block IDs and certificate hashes. - temper_v2.c: A more advanced tool that reads the signature block from one APK and patches it into another APK, effectively spoofing the signature. This can be used to bypass signature verification mechanisms in KernelSU, potentially leading to privilege escalation or root access. Both tools operate on APK files provided as command-line arguments and manipulate their binary structure at a low level. The exploit is a proof-of-concept for local privilege escalation on Android devices using KernelSU. No hardcoded network endpoints or IPs are present; all file paths are user-supplied. The repository is focused on demonstrating the vulnerability and providing tools for detection and exploitation via APK signature manipulation.
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