MLflow contained a vulnerability where an attacker could upload arbitrary files to the server via a PUT request. This flaw allows unauthenticated or unauthorized users to place files of their choosing onto the server's filesystem, potentially leading to further exploitation such as remote code execution or data compromise.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This three-file repository contains an MIT license, a detailed README, and one Python entry-point script, mlflow_pickle_rce.py. It is an operational, API-driven proof of concept for MLflow model-registry pickle deserialization leading to remote code execution, described as CVE-2024-37054-style and referencing CVE-2023-6015, CVE-2023-6018, and CVE-2024-37054. The script uses requests with HTTP Basic authentication to test MLflow API access, create or reuse a registered model, create an experiment run, upload an MLmodel manifest and malicious model.pkl, register a model version referencing those artifacts, and optionally transition the version to Production. The pickle executes os.system during unpickling and starts a Python reverse shell to configurable callback parameters. It does not identify a target model automatically or trigger model loading; a separate MLflow UI/API action, prediction service, or scheduled client job must load the registered model for execution to occur. Defaults include admin:password credentials, experiment ID 0, Production stage, and callback port 4444.
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