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In invoke-ai/invokeai version v5.0.2, the web API endpoint POST /api/v1/images/delete is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion. The endpoint does not properly validate or restrict file paths provided by the user, allowing unauthorized attackers to specify and delete any file on the server filesystem accessible to the application process. This includes critical files such as SSH keys, SQLite databases, and configuration files, leading to a significant security risk.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Python proof-of-concept exploit script (poc.py) and a .gitignore file. The exploit targets a web API endpoint (default: /api/v1/images/delete) by sending a POST request with a JSON payload specifying image names to delete. The script is configurable via command-line arguments for the base URL, port, endpoint path, and image names. It is designed to test or exploit an insecure or unauthenticated image deletion API. The script prints the HTTP response status and body, allowing the user to verify if the deletion was successful. No specific product or CVE is referenced, and the exploit is generic for any service exposing such an endpoint. The attack vector is network-based, requiring access to the target's HTTP API.
1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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