CVE-2024-13745: EDK II GPT TPM PCR[5] Measurement Mismatch
CVE-2024-13745 is a flaw in EDK II’s GPT measurement and parsing logic that allows the GUID Partition Table layout or metadata actually used by firmware to differ from what is measured into TPM PCR[5]. According to the disclosure, affected versions include EDK II releases up to and including edk2-stable202411, and later versions may also be affected because no fix was known at disclosure time. The issue arises from inconsistencies between DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib, which measures GPT data for TPM event logging, and PartitionDxe, which parses, validates, and may recover GPT structures for actual use. DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib reads the GPT header from LBA 1, applies comparatively relaxed validation, does not validate CRC32 checksums, does not consult the backup GPT header, and omits unused GPT partition entries from the measured structure. PartitionDxe, by contrast, performs stricter validation, reads both primary and backup GPT headers, and includes recovery logic. The disclosure further describes error-handling flaws in PartitionRestoreGptTable() and PartitionValidGptTable() where failures can leave PrimaryHeader populated with untrusted invalid data while execution continues down a path treating both GPT tables as valid. An attacker can exploit these discrepancies by preserving the GPT data that DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib measures while causing PartitionDxe to recover or use a different GPT header and partition entry array, including via malformed backup GPT headers and attacker-controlled AlternateLBA values. The result is a data-only integrity failure in which PCR[5] and TPM event logs can indicate an expected GPT state while firmware and the operating system use attacker-influenced partition layout or metadata.
Impact, mitigation & remediation
What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
Impact
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
Successful exploitation undermines the integrity guarantees expected from TPM PCR[5] measurements and TPM event logs for GPT state. An attacker can cause firmware and the operating system to use a malicious or altered partition layout or partition metadata while preserving the expected PCR[5] measurement. This can defeat security assumptions in TPM-based full disk encryption, measured boot, and remote/local attestation workflows where GPT layout or partition metadata is security-relevant. The impact is primarily integrity bypass rather than direct memory corruption: it enables stealthy manipulation of partitioning state, including metadata changes that may affect boot behavior, mounting behavior, or access-control assumptions, without corresponding measurement evidence.
Mitigation
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Do not rely on PCR[5] alone as a trustworthy representation of GPT integrity on affected systems. Where possible, disable security decisions that assume PCR[5] fully reflects partition layout or metadata until patched firmware is deployed. Use additional validation of GPT structures from the running OS or pre-boot environment, including CRC verification and comparison of primary and backup GPT headers and full partition entry arrays. Restrict attacker ability to modify disk metadata by enforcing physical security, protecting pre-boot write paths, and monitoring for unexpected GPT changes. In TPM-based FDE or attestation deployments, incorporate supplementary measurements or policy checks beyond PCR[5] when GPT state is security-relevant.
Remediation
Patch, then assume compromise.
Apply an EDK II update that makes GPT measurement semantics consistent with GPT parsing and recovery semantics once a vendor or upstream fix is available. Based on the disclosure, remediation should include: validating GPT structures during measurement with the same rigor as PartitionDxe, including CRC32 verification; measuring the complete GPT partition entry array rather than omitting unused entries; ensuring measurement accounts for backup-header-driven recovery behavior or otherwise measures the GPT state actually consumed by firmware; and correcting the error handling in PartitionRestoreGptTable() and PartitionValidGptTable() so failed validation or restore operations cannot leave stale or untrusted header data in use. If you maintain a downstream EDK II fork, review all releases up to edk2-stable202411 as affected and audit later versions as well because the disclosure states no fix was known.
Exploits
No public exploits tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
References
Frequently asked questions
- Is CVE-2024-13745 exploited in the wild?
- As of Nov 19, 2026, Mallory has no reports of CVE-2024-13745 being exploited in the wild. It is not listed in CISA KEV.
- Is there a public exploit for CVE-2024-13745?
- As of Nov 19, 2026, Mallory has found no public exploit for CVE-2024-13745.
- Is there a patch for CVE-2024-13745?
- Apply an EDK II update that makes GPT measurement semantics consistent with GPT parsing and recovery semantics once a vendor or upstream fix is available. Based on the disclosure, remediation should include: validating GPT structures during measurement with the same rigor as PartitionDxe, including CRC32 verification; measuring the complete GPT partition entry array rather than omitting unused entries; ensuring measurement accounts for backup-header-driven recovery behavior or otherwise measures the GPT state actually consumed by firmware; and correcting the error handling in PartitionRestoreGptTable() and PartitionValidGptTable() so failed validation or restore operations cannot leave stale or untrusted header data in use.
Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.