CVE-2024-1561 is an improper authorization flaw in gradio-app/gradio affecting the /component_server endpoint. The endpoint improperly permits invocation of arbitrary methods on a Component class using attacker-controlled arguments. By abusing the move_resource_to_block_cache() method of the Block class, an attacker can cause Gradio to copy an arbitrary file from the host filesystem into a temporary directory and then retrieve it through the application. This results in unauthorized local file read. The issue is particularly serious for internet-exposed Gradio deployments, including instances launched with launch(share=True), and also affects Gradio apps hosted on huggingface.co according to the provided content.
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launch(share=True). Avoid exposing vulnerable Gradio applications directly to the internet. Place instances behind strong access controls, network filtering, or authentication gateways where possible. Review the host for exposure of sensitive files and rotate any credentials, API keys, or tokens that may have been accessible to the Gradio process.Patch, then assume compromise.
/component_server endpoint no longer permits attacker-controlled arbitrary method invocation on component objects.1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository is a small standalone Python proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2024-1561, an arbitrary file read vulnerability in Gradio versions prior to 4.13.0. The repo contains two files: a README describing the vulnerability, attack flow, impact, and mitigation; and exploit.py, the actual exploit implementation. The Python script uses requests plus argparse and rich for CLI interaction and output. Its workflow is straightforward: it normalizes the supplied target URL, sends a GET request to /config to obtain the Gradio component list, selects the first component containing an id, then sends a POST request to /component_server with fn_name set to move_resource_to_block_cache and data set to an attacker-chosen filesystem path. If the server returns a temporary cache path, the script constructs /file=<temp_path> and downloads the file contents. The exploit therefore provides remote arbitrary file read, not code execution. It is operational rather than weaponized: it has a working hardcoded exploitation chain and customizable target file argument, but no advanced automation, evasion, or framework integration. Fingerprintable targets and paths include /config, /component_server, /file=..., and the default file /etc/passwd.
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2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
An arbitrary file read vulnerability affecting Gradio that can worsen exposure of internet-facing instances.
A Gradio local file inclusion vulnerability explicitly cited as exploited by the group in late 2024.
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