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CVE-2024-1813 is an unsafe deserialization vulnerability in the WordPress Simple Job Board plugin through version 2.11.0. The job_board_applicant_list_columns_value function deserializes untrusted job-application input, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to inject PHP objects. Exploitation can invoke a suitable PHP property-oriented programming (POP) chain supplied by another installed plugin or theme when a submitted application is viewed.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
Repository contains a working end-to-end PoC and a self-contained Docker lab for CVE-2024-1813, an unauthenticated PHP object injection in the WordPress Simple Job Board plugin. The main exploit file is sjb_cve_2024_1813.py, a standalone Python 3 script using only the standard library. It builds a serialized PHP object payload based on the Monolog/RCE1 gadget chain, re-scoped to AIOSEO\Vendor\Monolog to match classes shipped by All In One SEO. The script includes payload construction, escaped-string rewriting to preserve control bytes through sanitization, backslash doubling to survive wp_unslash(), nonce scraping from the public job page, and submission of the malicious application form. It supports attacker-controlled commands, print-only mode, custom field names, namespace prefix changes, proxying, SSL verification, and a '+' integer-prefix variant intended to evade simplistic WAF signatures. The exploit flow is two-stage: first, an unauthenticated user stores the serialized object through the public application form of a published job post; second, an administrator triggers deserialization by visiting the applicants list in wp-admin. The provided lab reproduces this with docker-compose.yml, which provisions WordPress 6.9.4, MariaDB 10.11, Simple Job Board 2.10.8, and All In One SEO 4.5.6. setup/setup.sh installs and configures the lab automatically via wp-cli, while trigger_exploit.sh logs into wp-admin with hardcoded lab credentials and requests /wp-admin/edit.php?post_type=jobpost_applicants to simulate the admin action that causes code execution. Overall, this is a real exploit repository rather than a detector. It is operational because it provides a complete payload and delivery mechanism for arbitrary command execution, but it is not part of a larger exploitation framework.
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An unauthenticated PHP object injection vulnerability in Simple Job Board versions 2.11.0 and earlier that can be chained to achieve remote code execution via AIOSEO/Monolog.
A critical PHP Object Injection vulnerability in the Simple Job Board plugin for WordPress caused by unsafe deserialization of untrusted input in the jobboardapplicantlistcolumns_value function.
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