F-logic DataCube3 version 1.0 contains an unrestricted file-upload vulnerability. An authenticated malicious actor can manipulate a filename extension to upload a file of a dangerous type.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a Python proof-of-concept exploit (datacube3.py) and a README describing its use against F-logic DataCube3 devices (version 1.0, Ubuntu-based). The exploit targets two vulnerabilities: CVE-2024-25830 (improper access control, allowing extraction of the root password) and CVE-2024-25832 (unrestricted file upload, allowing arbitrary PHP file upload). The attack is performed in several steps: (1) connect to the device's web interface to extract the root password, (2) authenticate as root to obtain a session cookie, (3) extract an 'accesstime' value required for the upload, (4) upload a PHP reverse shell to the device, and (5) trigger the shell to connect back to the attacker's machine. The script is run from the attacker's machine and requires the target's IP/port and the attacker's own IP/port for the reverse shell. The endpoints targeted are all on the device's web interface, specifically under /admin/config_all.php and /admin/setting_photo.php, with the shell being uploaded to /images/slideshow/rvs.php. The repository is a functional PoC and not a weaponized exploit, as the payload is hardcoded and the script is intended for demonstration and educational purposes.
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