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CVE-2024-30212 describes a vulnerability in the handling of SCSI READ(10) commands over USB, where specifying the maximum LBA (0xFFFFFFFF) with a default block size of 512 and a count of 1 causes the device to return the first 512 bytes of the 0x80000000 memory area. Increasing the block count allows exposure of the entire RAM. The same technique can be used to write to this memory area, potentially overwriting pointers and enabling further memory disclosure or manipulation, including access to Program and Boot Flash regions.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2024-30212, targeting USB mass storage devices vulnerable to unauthorized memory access via crafted SCSI commands. The main exploit logic is implemented in C across several files: - main.c: Entry point, handles argument parsing, device detection, and orchestrates read/write operations. - mass_storage.c/h: Implements SCSI command construction and communication for reading/writing device memory. - usb_device.c/h: Handles USB device enumeration, opening, and bulk data transfer using libusb. The exploit requires the user to set the target device's VID and PID in main.c, compile the code (requires libusb), and run the resulting binary with parameters to either read memory from the device (dumped to out.bin) or write data (either a fixed pattern or from in.bin) to the device's memory. The attack vector is local/physical, requiring direct connection to the target device. No network endpoints are present; the only fingerprintable endpoints are the file paths used for input/output. The code is a functional PoC, not weaponized, and demonstrates the vulnerability by enabling arbitrary memory access on affected USB devices.
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