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Traccar versions 5.1 through 5.12 contain an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the device image upload API. Attackers can upload files with arbitrary content, choose the directory, file extension, and partially control the file name. While overwriting existing files is not possible, new files can be created anywhere on the file system with attacker-controlled names and extensions. The default configuration exacerbates the issue, as self-registration is enabled and the service runs with root/system privileges, allowing files to be placed anywhere on the system.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/linux/http/traccar_rce_upload.rb) that exploits two vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-31214 and CVE-2024-24809) in Traccar v5.1-v5.12. The exploit works by first registering a new user (or authenticating as an existing one), creating a device, and then abusing the device image upload endpoint to perform a path traversal and upload a malicious cron job to /etc/cron.d/. This cron job executes attacker-supplied commands as root, leading to full remote code execution. The module is weaponized, supporting arbitrary command payloads (including reverse shells) and is designed for Red Hat-based Linux systems. The main attack vector is network-based, targeting the Traccar web interface (default port 8082). The code is well-structured, with clear separation of setup, authentication, and exploitation steps, and leverages Metasploit's HttpClient and FileDropper mixins for HTTP requests and cleanup.
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