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CVE-2024-3829 is a symlink-following vulnerability in the snapshot recovery process of qdrant/qdrant 1.9.0-dev. A crafted snapshot can contain symbolic links that reference files outside the intended snapshot directory. During recovery, an attacker can use such links to cause arbitrary file reads, or combine a symbolic link with a payload file to write arbitrary content to a targeted filesystem location.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small standalone Python exploit for CVE-2024-3829 affecting Qdrant 1.9.0-dev snapshot handling. The repo contains one main code file (`cve_2024_3829.py`), a dependency file (`requirements.txt` with `requests`), and a README describing setup and usage. It is not part of a larger exploit framework. The exploit targets Qdrant's HTTP snapshot import/export workflow. Its core technique is to create a collection, generate a snapshot, download the snapshot tar archive, modify it locally, and upload the tampered archive back to the server. In read mode, it inserts a symlink entry (`0/wal/sneaky`) pointing to an attacker-chosen filesystem path, then triggers snapshot recreation and re-downloads the snapshot to extract the linked file contents. In write mode, it builds a crafted tar containing attacker-controlled file content and abuses snapshot recovery to place or overwrite files on the target filesystem. The README and visible code indicate a third mode, `reverse_shell`, which combines file-write behavior with a listener and a trigger path intended to cause the target to connect back to the attacker. Fingerprintable target endpoints are the Qdrant REST API paths under `/collections/...`, especially collection creation, snapshot creation, snapshot download, snapshot upload, and snapshot deletion/recovery operations. The script also opens a local TCP listener on `0.0.0.0:<attacker_port>` for callback handling. Default/illustrative values in the repository include Qdrant port `6333`, attacker listener port `9001`, and example filesystem targets such as `/etc/passwd` and `/tmp/shell.sh`. Overall, this is a real exploit rather than a detector. It demonstrates practical post-exploitation primitives from the snapshot archive vulnerability: arbitrary file read, arbitrary file write, and attempted code execution/reverse shell. Because it includes active exploitation logic and a callback listener but appears to use relatively fixed workflows rather than a reusable framework, the maturity is best classified as OPERATIONAL.
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