Loading vulnerability…
CVE-2024-40586 is an improper access control vulnerability in FortiClient for Windows affecting version 7.4.0, 7.2.6 and below, and 7.0.13 and below. The flaw is associated with the FortiSSLVPNd service pipe. Due to insufficient access control on this local inter-process communication channel, a local user may be able to interact with the service in a way that results in privilege escalation.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2024-40586, a vulnerability in FortiClient for Windows (version 7.0.8.0427) that allows unprivileged users to coerce the FortiSSLVPNdaemon process to authenticate to arbitrary remote servers or local named pipes via a world-writable named pipe ('FortiSslvpnNamedPipe'). The exploit is implemented in C (poc-forticlient.cpp) and constructs a payload that triggers the daemon to open a file or connect to a UNC path specified by the attacker. This can be used for two main attack scenarios: (1) coercing the target to authenticate to an attacker-controlled server (potentially enabling NTLM relay or credential capture), and (2) local privilege escalation by impersonating the SYSTEM account via a named pipe. The repository includes Visual Studio project files and a detailed README explaining the vulnerability, exploitation steps, and attack scenarios. The main exploit logic is contained in a single C file, and no weaponized or framework-based automation is present.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.