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CVE-2024-40893 is an authenticated operating system command injection vulnerability in Firewalla Box Software versions prior to 1.979. An attacker with authenticated access to the Bluetooth Low-Energy (BTLE) interface can exploit the network configuration service to inject arbitrary OS commands into parameters such as networkConfig.Interface.Phy.Eth0.Extra.PingTestIP, networkConfig.Interface.Phy.Eth0.Extra.DNSTestDomain, and networkConfig.Interface.Phy.Eth0.Gateway6. The vulnerability is exacerbated by the fact that configuration changes can be synced to the Firewalla cloud, allowing persistence even after hardware resets or firmware re-flashes. The BTLE authentication mechanism is weak, relying on a license UUID transmitted in plaintext and not user-changeable, making it susceptible to sniffing or brute force attacks.
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This repository is a Go-based proof-of-concept exploit for Firewalla devices, targeting Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) vulnerabilities CVE-2024-40892 and CVE-2024-40893. The exploit operates in several stages: 1. It scans for Firewalla devices in BLE proximity and leaks the checksum of the device's License UUID. 2. If the full License UUID is obtained (either by brute-force or other means), the tool can back up the device configuration locally. 3. With the License UUID, it can provision root SSH credentials on the device (CVE-2024-40892). 4. It exploits three command injection vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-40893) by writing payloads to specific configuration fields, resulting in the creation of files on the device (e.g., /tmp/pwn5, /tmp/pwn6, /tmp/pwn7) as a demonstration of code execution. The code is organized into a main entry point (main.go) and supporting packages for BLE interaction (pkg/btapi) and cryptographic operations (pkg/fwsecurity). The exploit requires the attacker to be within BLE range of the target device and, for full exploitation, to know or recover the device's License UUID. The repository is operational and demonstrates real-world exploitation of the referenced CVEs, including credential provisioning and command execution on the target device.
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