CVE-2024-41817 is an arbitrary code execution vulnerability affecting the AppImage distribution of ImageMagick. During execution, the AppImage may set the MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH and LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variables in a way that includes an empty path element. This can cause the runtime to search the current working directory for configuration files or shared libraries. If an attacker can place a malicious configuration file or shared object in that directory and induce execution from it, ImageMagick may load attacker-controlled content. The issue is specific to the AppImage packaging behavior and is fixed in ImageMagick version 7.11-36.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a fully automated exploit for the Hack The Box 'Titanic' machine, targeting a chain of vulnerabilities for initial access and privilege escalation. The main script, 'autopwn.py', is a two-phase Python tool: - **Phase 1** exploits a Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in the web application at 'titanic.htb' via the '/download?ticket=' endpoint. It retrieves the Gitea SQLite database, extracts user password hashes, and formats them for hashcat to facilitate offline password cracking. - **Phase 2** uses the cracked credentials to SSH into the target as the 'developer' user. It then compiles and uploads a malicious shared object (libxcb.so.1) and a dummy image to a directory monitored by a root-owned automation script. This triggers exploitation of ImageMagick (CVE-2024-41817), resulting in the SUID bit being set on /bin/bash, allowing the attacker to escalate privileges to root. The repository includes a detailed write-up (WriteUP.md) explaining each step, the vulnerabilities exploited, and mitigation advice. The only code file is 'autopwn.py', which automates the exploitation process. The exploit targets specific endpoints and file paths on the Titanic HTB machine, and the payload is a C shared object designed for privilege escalation. The attack vectors are both network-based (LFI, SSH) and local (privilege escalation via ImageMagick).
This repository is a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2024-41817, a vulnerability in ImageMagick (<= 7.1.1-35) that allows arbitrary code execution via malicious XML delegation. The main file, exploit.py, is a Python script that can: - Detect if a remote target is running a vulnerable version of ImageMagick via SSH (using paramiko). - Generate malicious payloads: either a crafted delegates.xml file or a C source for a shared library (libxcb.so) that executes an attacker-supplied command. - Compile the shared library using GCC and deploy the payload to the target system over SSH. The exploit supports several modes: detection only, payload build only, or full automation (detect, build, deploy, and execute). The attacker must provide SSH credentials for the target. The payloads are written to the 'out/' directory. The repository includes a requirements.txt (paramiko) and a README.md with detailed usage instructions. The exploit is a functional POC and does not include weaponized features such as automated post-exploitation or payload customization beyond the supplied command.
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2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.