CVE-2024-42049 affects TightVNC Server for Windows before version 2.8.84. The vulnerability allows an attacker to connect to the server's control pipe via a network connection. Based on the available information, a control interface that should not be reachable remotely is exposed in a way that permits network-originated access. Specific implementation details, such as the exact vulnerable function or pipe access logic, are not provided in the supplied content.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository provides a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2024-42049, a vulnerability in TightVNC Server for Windows (versions before 2.8.84) that allows attackers to connect to the server's control named pipes over the network via SMB. The main exploit file, 'CVE-2024-42049-PoC.c', is a C program that connects to the specified named pipe on a target system and sends one of several administrative commands (disconnect clients, get client list, shutdown server, get server info, get server config). If the 'get server config' command is used and the control pipe is not protected by a password, the exploit can retrieve the server's configuration, including encrypted passwords, which it then decrypts using a hardcoded DES key (implemented in 'descrypt.c' and 'descrypt.h'). The exploit requires SMB access to the target and valid credentials to connect to the named pipe. The repository includes Visual Studio project files for building the PoC, as well as a README with usage instructions and context. The attack vector is network-based, targeting named pipes exposed by TightVNC over SMB. The endpoints of interest are the named pipes '\\<target>\pipe\TightVNC_Service_Control' and '\\.\pipe\TightVNC_Application_Control_On_Session#'.
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4 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.