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The 'deploy-website.yml' GitHub Actions workflow in the gradio-app/gradio repository (main branch) is vulnerable to secrets exfiltration due to improper authorization controls. The workflow explicitly checks out and executes code from forked repositories, which can be controlled by untrusted actors. This design flaw allows attackers to execute arbitrary code with access to repository secrets and permissions, including GITHUB_TOKEN, HF_TOKEN, VERCEL_ORG_ID, VERCEL_PROJECT_ID, COMMENT_TOKEN, AWSACCESSKEYID, AWSSECRETKEY, and VERCEL_TOKEN. The vulnerable workflow is located at .github/workflows/deploy-website.yml.
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