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A directory traversal vulnerability exists in Gogs versions up to and including 0.13.0, specifically in the editFilePost function within internal/route/repo/editor.go. The vulnerability allows attackers to manipulate file paths and access files outside the intended repository directory.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This two-file repository contains a README and a Python 3 operational exploit for CVE-2024-44625 affecting Gogs installations described as version 0.13.0-era / <=0.13.0. The script authenticates to Gogs, creates an empty repository through the REST API (unless --reuse is selected), initializes a local Git repository, and commits a symlink whose target is the absolute server-side pre-receive-hook path. It pushes that symlink to a non-default branch, then submits payload text through Gogs's web editor. The intended vulnerability primitive causes the editor to follow the symlink and create the otherwise absent hooks/pre-receive file. Finally, the script pushes one or more newly named branches, causing the server-side pre-receive hook to execute. The only code entry point is gogs_rce_shell.py; it uses Python requests for HTTP interaction and local git subprocess calls. It includes reverse- and bind-shell payload modes, randomized repository/symlink names when omitted, CSRF/session-cookie handling, and a reuse mode for retriggering an existing poisoned repository.
This repository contains a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2024-44625, targeting Gogs version 0.13.0 on Linux. The exploit is implemented in a single Python script (poc.py) and requires valid credentials for a user account with repository push and web edit permissions. The script automates the process of logging in to the Gogs web interface, creating a new repository, pushing a malicious symlink as a git hook, and editing the symlink via the web interface to inject a payload. The payload is a bash script that executes the 'id' command and writes its output to /tmp/exploit_success on the server, demonstrating arbitrary command execution. The attack vector is network-based, leveraging HTTP(S) endpoints exposed by the Gogs web interface. The repository structure is minimal, consisting of a README and the exploit script. No detection or fake code is present; the exploit is functional and demonstrates the vulnerability.
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