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CVE-2024-45798 describes multiple Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE) vulnerabilities in the arduino-esp32 project, specifically affecting its continuous integration (CI) workflows. The vulnerabilities include code injection in the tests_results.yml workflow (GHSL-2024-169) and environment variable injection (GHSL-2024-170). These issues could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or manipulate the CI environment by poisoning artifacts or environment variables used in the workflow.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This is not a conventional host/device exploit toolkit. It is an automated research artifact containing a verbatim September 2024 snapshot of Espressif's Arduino-ESP32 project, explicitly repurposed to reproduce published GitHub Actions workflow vulnerabilities with dummy secrets. The repository combines Arduino/ESP-IDF C and C++ core code (`cores/esp32`), build configuration (`CMakeLists.txt`, `Kconfig.projbuild`), CI helper scripts under `.github/scripts`, and numerous GitHub Actions workflows. The primary exploit-relevant file is `.github/workflows/dangerjs.yml`. It is triggered by `pull_request_target`, explicitly grants write access to repository contents and pull requests, and checks out `github.event.pull_request.head.sha`—attacker-controlled pull-request code—before invoking `espressif/shared-github-dangerjs`. This is a high-risk CI trust-boundary pattern: if the action loads DangerJS configuration or other executable content from the checked-out PR, an attacker PR can execute code with the privileged workflow token. The provided material contains the vulnerable workflow configuration, but no malicious Dangerfile, shell payload, reverse shell, credential exfiltration code, or target-specific CVE identifier. Other workflows implement normal project automation: compiling ESP32 sketches across ESP32/S2/S3/C3/C6/H2 targets, testing on hardware/Wokwi/QEMU, publishing releases and GitHub Pages content, downloading toolchains, signing generated Windows binaries, and interacting with GitHub APIs. These auxiliary scripts expose several CI network endpoints and use token-bearing API calls, but they are not themselves presented as an attacker payload. The embedded ESP32 framework supports networking, OTA, Bluetooth, USB CDC/MSC/DFU, filesystem, and cryptographic utilities; these are normal framework capabilities rather than exploit behavior.
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