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CVE-2024-47179 describes an Artifact Poisoning vulnerability in the RSSHub repository's GitHub Actions workflow (docker-test-cont.yml) prior to commit 64e00e7. The workflow would extract artifacts from a previous workflow run without validating their contents, allowing a malicious contributor to upload a crafted artifact containing files such as a malicious package.json. This could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the privileged workflow, potentially leading to a full repository takeover. The vulnerability was fixed in commit 64e00e7 by validating artifact contents before extraction.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This is not a typical vulnerability exploit against RSSHub. It is a 100-file automated research artifact that snapshots DIYgod/RSSHub and modifies or preserves GitHub Actions workflows to reproduce a public CI/CD workflow vulnerability. The README explicitly identifies it as a disposable thesis lab, says the upstream project is not targeted, and states that all repository secrets/variables are dummy values. RSSHub itself is a Node.js TypeScript/JavaScript RSS-feed generator built around Hono; its server entry point is `lib/index.ts`, application middleware/routes are in `lib/`, an optional Vercel adapter is `api/vercel.ts`, and container deployment is provided by `Dockerfile` and `docker-compose.yml`. The material security-relevant workflow chain is: a pull request runs `docker-test.yml`, builds an image from PR-controlled repository content, exports it as `rsshub.tar.zst`, and uploads it as a GitHub Actions artifact. `docker-test-cont.yml` is triggered by the completed workflow via `workflow_run`; it downloads that artifact, runs `docker load`, and starts the resulting `rsshub:latest` container. This crosses a trust boundary because a downstream workflow executes an artifact built from untrusted PR input. The downstream job has pull-request write permission and uses authenticated GitHub Actions script/API steps, although the supplied workflow does not deliberately pass `GITHUB_TOKEN` or another secret into the container. Therefore, the repository demonstrates the unsafe artifact/image execution condition but contains no explicit post-exploitation command, reverse shell, token theft, or destructive behavior. Other notable code is ordinary RSSHub functionality: route discovery/registration (`lib/registry.ts`), RSS/Atom/JSON rendering, request filtering and sanitization, optional Redis caching, access-key checks, OpenAI-based title/description processing, optional remote configuration retrieval, anti-hotlink URL rewriting, and Sentry telemetry when configured. The included `routes-deprecated` JavaScript files fetch public content sources for RSS conversion and are unrelated to the CI workflow proof-of-concept. The `REMOTE_CONFIG` setting and configurable OpenAI endpoint are outbound-request features and should be treated carefully in any deployment, but they are not an embedded exploit payload. No CVE identifier is provided in the available content.
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