A flaw in the TLS certificate validation logic in Icinga 2 (versions 2.4.0 and later, prior to 2.14.3, 2.13.10, 2.12.11, and 2.11.12) allows an attacker to impersonate trusted cluster nodes or API users authenticated via TLS client certificates. The vulnerability affects both JSON-RPC and HTTP API connections, undermining the trust model of Icinga 2 clusters and API authentication.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a Python-based exploit and scanner for CVE-2024-49369, a vulnerability in the Icinga agent's JSON-RPC protocol. The exploit targets Icinga agents by impersonating a legitimate master or satellite node, allowing the attacker to update configuration and execute arbitrary commands if the agent is configured to accept such actions (default for monitored nodes). The main exploit logic is implemented in 'main.py', which uses asynchronous networking and SSL to interact with the agent over TCP port 5665. The tool supports both scanning for vulnerable agents on a subnet and exploiting a specific agent to gain a reverse shell (using a Perl payload). Even if command execution is disabled, the tool can leak sensitive configuration and monitoring data. The repository includes a Dockerfile for containerized execution, a requirements.txt for dependencies, and detailed usage instructions in the README.md, including setup for local testing with Icinga Docker images. No hardcoded IPs or domains are present, but the default port and file paths for test certificates are fingerprintable. The exploit is operational and provides a working payload for remote code execution.
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