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CVE-2024-53326 affects LINQPad Pro editions before 5.52.01. The vulnerability is an unsafe deserialization issue in LINQPad.AutoRefManager::PopulateFromCache(). Deserialization of untrusted or attacker-controlled cached data can result in execution of attacker-supplied code during object reconstruction. Based on the provided information, the issue is specific to the Pro edition and the vulnerable code path is PopulateFromCache() in the AutoRefManager component.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (Ruby file) that exploits a local deserialization vulnerability in LINQPad (up to version 5.48.00, paid version only) on Windows. The exploit works by overwriting a specific cache file (AutoRefCache46.1.dat) in the LINQPad cache directory with a malicious .NET deserialization payload. When LINQPad restarts, it deserializes this file, resulting in execution of arbitrary OS commands and persistence for the attacker. The module includes checks to verify the presence and version of the cache file, and provides backup/restore functionality for the original file. The exploit is operational and requires local access to the target's file system. No network endpoints are involved; the attack vector is local file manipulation. The only fingerprintable endpoints are the cache file paths used by LINQPad.
4 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.