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CVE-2024-56431 is an invalid shift operation in libtheora. The issue is reported in the oc_huff_tree_unpack function in huffdec.c in Theora through 1.0 7180717, where a negative value can be used as the left operand of a left-shift operation. This constitutes undefined behavior in C and can lead to incorrect program state or other unintended results during Huffman tree unpacking while processing crafted Theora media data. The issue is disputed by third parties, who state that there is no evidence of a security impact such as an application crash. Based on the available information, the defect is best characterized as a correctness and robustness flaw involving undefined behavior rather than a clearly demonstrated exploitable memory-corruption vulnerability.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a proof-of-concept (PoC) fuzzer for the libtheora video decoding library. The main file, fuzzer.cpp, implements a custom harness that feeds a hardcoded, potentially malformed Theora video stream into the libtheora decoder. The code is designed to exercise the decoder's initialization, header parsing, comment processing, and frame decoding logic, using memory test hooks to check for memory safety issues. The README provides compilation and execution instructions, indicating the use of AddressSanitizer and UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer to catch memory errors. The exploit is not weaponized; it is a local PoC intended to trigger and detect vulnerabilities in libtheora, such as buffer overflows or use-after-free bugs, when processing crafted video data. No network or remote attack vectors are present, and the only fingerprintable endpoint is the static library file used for linking. The structure is typical for a fuzzing PoC: a single C++ source file and a README with build/run instructions.
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2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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